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The Reception and Processing of Minors in the
United States in Comparison to that of Australia
and Canada: Would Being a Party to the UN
Convention on the Right of the Child Make a
Difference in U.S. Courts?
BY ELIANA CORONA*
I.

Introduction

In 2014, a surge of minors flocking to the United States from various
Central American countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras took place. U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended 47,000
thousand unaccompanied migrant children entering the United States
during 2014.1
At the same time as this Central American surge, Syrian refugees were
fleeing their native country and seeking refuge in several countries, including
Australia and Canada. In 2015, Australia decided to accept 12 thousand
Syrian refugees.2 Likewise, in 2016, Canada pledged $8.5 million to
support refugees over the time span of two and a half years.3
Unlike in Australia and Canada, on January 25, 2017, the President of

* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
Vassar College (2014). I would like to thank Professor Chimene Keitner for her priceless
time and guidance on this project. I would also like to thank my colleagues at HICLR for
their hard work on this publication, as well as my family and friends for their support.
1. Marco Cáceres, Child Migrants from Central America: ‘War Refugees’
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 19, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marco-caceres/childmigrants-from-centr_b_5509861.html.
2. Australia receives first five Syrian refugee, BBC NEWS, Nov. 17, 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-34830118.
3. Allison Jones, Ontario ‘on track’ to receive 10k Syrian refugees by end of
February, says Kathleen Wynee, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 8, 2016, http://www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-on-track-to-receive-10k-syrian-refugees-by-end-of-febr
uary-says-kathleen-wynne-1.3439093.
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the United States issued an executive order4 that called for the
immediate suspension of all refugee admission to the
United States for 120 days. Although the change affects
greater numbers of migrants fleeing war-torn regions of
Africa, Asia and the Middle East . . . [immigration]
advocates say the order could have dangerous
consequences for children and their families in countries
such as El Salvador and Honduras.5
After the executive order was issued, immigration officials detained
children seeking refuge, in particular at U.S. airports.6
The focus of this paper is on the treatment and processing of minors7
who are unlawfully crossing the borders into the United States, Australia,
and Canada. All three countries are parties to the Refugee Convention,
while only Australia and Canada are parties to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). Using both of these treaties, I will explore how
being a party (or not) affects the immigration outcomes of minors.

A.

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

In 1989, the U.N. adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child
— the first legally binding international treaty that incorporates and states a
full range of human rights specifically for children.8 As of 2015, 196
countries have become State Parties to the Convention by ratifying the
CRC,9 including Australia10 (which ratified it on Dec. 17, 1990)11 and
4. The executive order is in current ongoing litigation. See Liam Stack, Trump’s
Executive Order on Immigration: What We Know and What We Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/trump-refugee-ban-muslim-executive-ord er.html.
5. Kate Linthicum, Also Barred by Trump’s Executive Order: These Heavily Vetted
Kids From Central America, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/
mexico-americas/la-fg-central-american-refugees-20170131-story.html.
6. Heather Digby Parton, Child Refugees from Central America are Being Turned
Away, too: The Human Cost of Trump’s Ban Grows Daily, SALON, Feb. 2, 2017,
http://www.salon.com/2017/02/02/child-refugees-from-central-america-are-being-turnedaway-too-the-human-cost-of-trumps-ban-grows-daily/.
7. I will look into both unaccompanied and accompanied minors. An unaccompanied
minor is defined as a child, under the age of 18, who has no lawful immigration status in the
United States and has “no parent or legal guardian in the United States that is available to
provide care and physical custody.” Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462, 6 U.S.C § 279
(2005). Canada and Australia also have the same/similar definitions of unaccompanied
minor.
8. Protecting Children’s Rights, UNICEF (May 19, 2014), http://www.unicef.org/
crc/index_protecting.html.
9. Frequently Asked Questions, UNICEF (June 24, 2016), http://www.unicef.org
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Canada (which ratified it on Dec. 13, 1991).12 Although the United States
signed the CRC on February 16, 1995,13 to this day, the United States is
one of only two countries that have not ratified14 the CRC.15 Somalia is the
second country that has not ratified the treaty.16
There are three provisions of the CRC that are especially applicable
and important for considering the immigration systems of the United
States, Canada, and Australia. The first is Article 3 of the CRC. This
Article states that in all actions concerning children, including those taken
in the courts of law, “the best interests of the child shall be the primary
concern.”17 The international community recognizes this principle as a
child’s fundamental human right.18
The second, Article 22 of the CRC, deals expressly with refugee
children,19 declaring:
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure
that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is
considered a refugee . . . receive appropriate protection and
humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable
rights set forth in the present Convention and in other
international human rights.20
The third is Article 19 of the CRC. This Article states children have the
/crc/index_30225.html.
10. A Last Rresort? National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, AUSTL.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N (May 13, 2004), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/lastresort-national-inquiry-children-immigration-detention/4-australias-human-rights.
11. View the Ratification Status by Country or by Treaty, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHT OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBody
External/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The U.S. government’s reason for not ratifying the CRC is that it undertakes an
extensive examination and scrutiny of treaties, which can take several years and only
considers one human rights treaty at a time. Currently, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is Top priority. Id.
15. Id.
16. Frequently Asked Questions, UNICEF (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.
unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html.
17. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1460
[hereinafter “CRC”].
18. About Us: Processing in Canada Claims for Refugee Protection of Minors and
Vulnerable Groups, GOV’T. OF CAN., (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources
/tools/refugees/canada/processing/minors.asp.
19. Judith Farbey, A Legal Analysis of Child-Sensitive Asylum Procedures, 28(3) J.
IMMIGR., ASYLUM & NAT’L L., 254, 255 (2014).
20. CRC, supra note 17, at art. 22.
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right to be protected from “all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including
sexual abuse.”21
While not every child who claims refugee protection will be granted
refugee status, the CRC has specific provisions on how to go about a case
involving a child, including making the best interest of the child a priority.
Most children that come to court have no idea what the immigration process
entails and need a representative to protect their interests. Even if the refugee
status is denied, at least referencing the CRC will give the child the opportunity
to fair consideration. In Canada and Australia the courts reference the CRC
provisions when the hearing affects a child. For example, in Australia
immigration courts reference Article 22 of the CRC to argue that children are a
recognized identifiable group that merit asylum consideration.22

B.
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”)23 is an international treaty, which aims to protect the most
vulnerable people in the world: refugees.24 The 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 amendment, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Refugee Protocol”),25 reaffirm the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’ Article 14, recognizing “the right of persons to seek asylum from
persecution in other countries.”26 There are currently 145 State Parties to
the 1951 Convention, including Australia, Canada, and the U.S.27
Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention defines “refugee” as a
person “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to

21. CRC, supra note 17, at art. 19.
22. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. VFAY,
(2003) FCAFC 191, at ¶ 35 (Austl.).
23. The Convention entered into force on April 22, 1954. It has been subject to only
one amendment: the 1967 Protocol. UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees at 2 (2010) [hereinafter “Refugee Protocol”].
24. UNHCR, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html.
25. Refugee Protocol, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. UNHCR, State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol 1-2, 4 (2015).
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such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”28
Although the definition explicitly states “refugees” are the only ones who
are considered, the Refugee Convention has created the international
standard for evaluating an asylum seeker’s claim of persecution. Today,
Australia,29 Canada,30 and the United States31 use this refugee standard in
their respective, domestic courts of law.
Part II of the paper will analyze how Canada’s immigration system
aligns with the CRC and the Refugee Convention. Part III of this paper
will analyze how Australia’s immigration system has implemented the
CRC and the Refugee Convention in their immigration proceedings. Part
IV will compare Canada and Australia’s system. Since the U.S. is not part
of the CRC, Part V of the paper will focus on the U.S. immigration system
regarding the treatment and processing of children and how the Refugee
Convention has played a role.

II.

Canada

As a signatory to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, Canada
has incorporated the definition of a “Convention refugee” as it is set out
in the Convention.32 In order to set forth a refugee claim, the claimant
must satisfy the Convention refugee definition set out in Section 96 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The IRPA defines
a Convention refugee as a person who “by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside each of their
countries of his nationality and is unable or, by reasons of that fear,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries.”33 As a party to the Refugee Convention, Canada’s Section
96 definition in the IRPA is almost identical to that of Article 1(A)(2) of
the Refugee Convention. Canada’s policy on this front is therefore

28. Refugee Protocol, supra note 23, at 14.
29. Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) 244 CLR
144, 1 (Austl.).
30. Duale v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2004] F.C. 150 ¶ 1
(Can.).
31. Christine M. Gordon, Are Unaccompanied Alien Children Really Getting a Fair
Trial?, 33 Denv. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 641, 646. (2005).
32. Stacey A. Saufert, Closing the Door to Refugees: The Denial of Due Process or
Refugee Claimants in Canada. 70 SASK. L. REV. 27, 30 (2007).
33. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, art. 96 (Can.) [hereinafter
“IRPA”].
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aligned with the Convention.
The Convention requires that all asylum- seekers have a “full hearing
or review34 of their claims and that such decisions be ‘reached in
accordance with due process of law.’” 35 Additionally, as part of the
Refugee Convention, Canada is also required to give refugees the right to
access to the courts if they wish to make a refugee claim.36

A.

Immigration Process

In order to gain refugee status in Canada,37 an immigration officer
must first review the applicant’s claim and determine if they are even
eligible. If the applicant is eligible, he proceeds to the next stage: an
administrative hearing before the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) of
the Immigration and Refugee Board (“Board”). If the RPD approves the
claim, the applicant may obtain permanent resident status, which can
potentially lead to citizenship.38
If the RPD denies a claim, the applicant can apply for leave to seek
judicial review before the Federal Court of Canada. This decision is final.39
If the judge grants leave, the applicant can proceed to receive a full merits
hearing before the Federal Court, which can either remand the case back to
the RPD before a different RPD member or instruct the RPD to grant the
applicant refugee status.40
If an unaccompanied minor under the age of 18 is the applicant, under
subsection 167(2) of the IRPA, the Board must designate a representative
for the applicant.41 The Act provisions, as well as the provisions of the
Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR 2002-228, provide the obligation
of the court to designate a representative42 for the claimant as soon as the
34. IRPA, supra note 30, at art. 32(2).
35. Saufert, supra note 29, at 31.
36. Id.
37. While one can apply for refugee status in Canada through the Overseas Program–
where refugees are selected by visa officers abroad or the Inland Program which is
conducted within Canadian territory–for the purposes of this paper, I will only be looking at
the Inland Program.
38. Stephen Meili, When do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum Seekers? A Study of
Theory and Practice in Canadian Jurisprudence Since 1990, 51 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 627,
638 (2014).
39. Id. at 639.
40. Id.
41. Duale, 2004 F.C. 150, ¶ 3 (Can.).
42. Although legal counsel for the claimant may also be appointed as the designated
representative, the roles of the two are distinct, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/
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Board becomes aware the claimant is an unaccompanied minor.43
Article 22 of the CRC states children must “receive appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance.”44 Here, the minor is in a court of law
in a foreign country, thus chances are he will not understand the process he is
about to embark on. By assigning the minor a representative, Canada’s own
domestic law aligns with the CRC. In addition to the CRC, Canada took its
own steps in assuring its compliance with the best interests of the child.

B.

Children: A Vulnerable Group

After becoming a party to the CRC and recognizing Canada has an
obligation to ensure a child seeking refugee status receives appropriate
protection, on September 30, 1996, IRB issued the groundbreaking
guidance Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues
(“Guidelines”). In the Guidelines, the Canadian government recognized
that refugee claims are a particular challenge since children represent an
especially vulnerable group.45 The Guidelines also recognized that children
cannot articulate their own refugee claims the same way as adults.
Accordingly, the Guidelines establish additional procedural steps the courts
must follow when assessing a minor’s claim.
The Guidelines conform to the obligations of the CRC. Further, they
impose an additional obligation on Canada to do what is in the best interest
of the child. The IRPA did not have specific provisions for processing the
claims of children in court, with the exception of the designation of a
representative. However, the Guidelines do. Canada’s addition of the
Guidelines filled an important gap and established how committed they are
to protecting interests of unaccompanied minors in their immigration
system.
Another example of this strong commitment to the best interests of
these children is Section Three of the Guidelines, entitled “Processing
Claims of Unaccompanied Children.” Section Three explicitly states the
“best interests of the child should be given primary consideration at all
stages of the processing of these claims.”46 This provision is parallel to the
references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir03.aspx#note2.
43. Id.
44. CRC, art. 22(1).
45. Asylum Officer Basic Training Course (AOBTC) Guidelines for Children’s Asylum
Claims, USCIS, RAIO, Asylum Division, Sept. 1, 2009, at 12.
46. Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson pursuant to §65(3) of the Immigration Act, §3
(1996),
http://www.irbcisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir03.
aspx#AIII.
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CRC’s “best interest” of the child provision. In order to assure this
provision is followed, there are certain procedures the Board must follow,
including: The claim should be given “scheduling and processing
priority . . . [and in] determining what evidence the child is able to provide
and the best way to elicit this evidence, the panel should consider . . . the
age and mental development of the child . . . capacity of the child to recall
past events and the time that has elapsed since the events, and the capacity
of the child to communicate his experiences.”47 While these are strong
procedures, looking to actual immigration proceedings helps to answer the
real question of how closely Canada implements the CRC.
In Stumf v. Canada, one of the applicants, a Hungarian-born child,
was not assigned a representative during his initial claim and was
subsequently denied refugee status.48 The Federal Court of Appeals held
that the Board had to reopen the minor’s refugee claim. The Federal Court
found this way despite the decision by a two-member panel of the
Convention Refugee Determination Division of the IRB that the Applicant
had abandoned his claim and should therefore be denied refugee status.49
The lack of assigning a representative to the minor in his initial claim
violated subsection 69(4) of the Immigration Act.50 Similarly, in Duale v.
Canada, the 16-year-old applicant was not assigned a representative during
his initial claim. However, the proceedings did not get as far along as they
did in Stumf. As a result, the Court remitted the matter for redetermination
affirming that the “failure to appoint a designated representative could have
affected the outcome of the claim.51“ While Stumf does not specifically
reference the CRC as a reason to reopen the case, lack of representation
was evidently against the best interest of the child provisions emphasized in
CRC Article 3 and Article 22, which require the child “receive appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance.” In the following case, the Court
does explicitly reference the CRC when making a decision that affects a
child.
In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), the
Court granted a Jamaican-born mother permanent residency based upon
humanitarian and compassionate considerations, pursuant to section 114(2)
of the Immigration Act. The court’s rationale was based in part on what

47. Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson pursuant to §65(3) of the Immigration Act, §3
(1996) ¶ 6.
48. Stumf v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, (2002) FCA 148, ¶ 7 (CAN).
49. Id.
50. Id. at ¶ 6.
51. Duale, 2004 FC 150, ¶ 1.
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decision would be in the best interest of the child.52 The court held that
“attentiveness and sensitivity to the importance of the rights of children, to
their best interest, and to the hardship that may be caused to them by a
negative decision is essential for an H & C decision to be made in a
reasonable matter.”53 However, the court did state that “it is not to say that
children’s best interest must always outweigh other considerations,54” but
this should be considered “where the interests of children are minimized, in
a manner inconsistent with Canada’s humanitarian and compassionate
tradition and the Minister’s guidelines.”55
Although the Baker case dealt with granting relief to an adult, the case
reflects the importance of taking into consideration the best interests of the
child. Article 9(1) of the CRC states: “State Parties shall ensure that a child
shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except
when . . . such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.” The
applicant was a mother of two whose deportation would significantly impact
her two Canadian-born children. As a signatory party to the CRC, the
Canadian government took into account the “importance of being attentive to
the rights and best interests of children when decisions are made that relate to
and affect their future.”56 Taking into account that separation from the parents
was not in the best interest of the children, the Court granted the mother legal
status in Canada. The decision directly affected the child; as such the Court
explicitly referenced the CRC before making a decision.
These cases demonstrate that while the CRC is not legally binding, it
does have the potential to influence case outcomes. Although the Court in
de Guzman v. Canada57 held that paragraph 3(3)(f)58 of the IRPA does not
incorporate the CRC into domestic law, the court stated the IRPA should be
construed and applied in a manner consistent with the CRC. Looking to the
previously discussed cases, would the case outcome have been different if
the court did not consider the best interests of the children, thus complying
with the CRC? Probably, since the mother in Baker was to be deported prior
to the appeal.59 Nevertheless, just as Baker illustrates an instance where the
52. Baker v. Canada (Minster of Citizenship & Immigration), 1999 CarswellNat 1124
at ¶ 75 (Can.).
53. Baker, 1999 CarswellNat 1124, at ¶74.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶ 71.
57. de Guzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 149, ¶ 73
(Can.).
58. IRPA, art. 3(3)(f). This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that
complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory.
59. Baker, (1999) CarswellNat 1124, at ¶ 6.
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court took into consideration a child’s best interest when deciding an
immigration case, one could counter argue that there are also cases where the
outcome is not always positive. Thus the CRC may not always encourage a
favorable outcome in domestic Canadian cases.
In Kim v. Canada,60 the applicants were brothers from South Korea
applying for refugee status under section 96 of the IRPA.61 The brothers
fled South Korea after their father’s death and their mother’s inability to
care for them.62 The RPD denied their asylum application because they did
not fit the “definition of refugees under section 96 of the IRPA on the basis
that they do not have a well-founded fear that they will be persecuted in
South Korea on one of the grounds specified therein.63“ The claimants
appealed.
Similarly to Baker, in this case, the court also took into consideration
the CRC during the appeal.64 The Court held that,
When determining whether child refugee claimants meet the definition
of “Convention refugees” under section 96 of the IRPA, attention must be
paid to three factors: first, that children have distinctive rights under the
CRC; second, that these rights influence decisions made under the IRPA as
a result of paragraph 3(3)(f) and third, that children exist in a state of
vulnerability which might make them more susceptible to “persecution”
than adults.65
Even though the Court held the CRC should be taken into
consideration when deciding a case regarding a minor, the Court denied the
refugee status explaining “the RPD made a reasonable decision when it
found that the Applicants had not adduced sufficient probative evidence to
rebut the presumption that state protection is available.”66 Thus, the Court
makes it clear that the CRC is not the sole determinative of a case. The
Court noted that “the IRPA is to be construed and applied in accordance
with instruments such as the CRC,” but even then the court denied them
refugee status.67 The court reiterates that the “best interests of the child

60. Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 149, at ¶ 10
(Can.).
61. IRPA, art. 96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well- founded
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion.
62. Kim, 2010 FC 149, at ¶ 11.
63. Id. ¶ 16.
64. Id. ¶ 73.
65. Id. ¶ 73.
66. Id. ¶ 77.
67. Id. ¶ 74.
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cannot shoehorn a refugee claimant into the section 96 definition if the
child’s claim would otherwise be rejected, but it can influence the process
which leads to that decision.”68 Here, the applicants did not meet the
definition of Convention refugee, because they failed to produce sufficient
evidence and thus were denied refugee status.69
While the CRC is not the sole factor courts take into account when
ruling on a case involving a child, as we see in Kim, it is still influential to
the case. Had the applicants met the requirements of the definition of a
refugee, would they have been granted refugee status? Perhaps; even
though the applicants were denied status, the court does make it a point to
highlight children’s vulnerability and the court’s need to reference the
CRC. The CRC highlights the best interest of the child and emphasizes the
importance of seeing children as children, which includes ensuring they are
represented. While the Refugee Convention definition does prevail, without
the CRC’s consideration that balances in favor of protecting children’s
interests, it is more likely than not that more children would get denied
refugee status. In Kim, the applicants were denied status, however, as the
other cases demonstrate, the CRC could be the determinative factor needed
to balance an outcome in favor of the child.

C.

Referencing the CRC and Compliance with the
Refugee Convention

As seen in Stumf, the court held the minor’s claim should be reopened
since he was not assigned a representative in his initial claim. The court
recognized that a child cannot represent himself and needs the assistance of
a representative who will fight for their best interest. While the court did
not explicitly reference the CRC to make this decision, it does align with
the best interest of the child. In Kim, the court looked to the Refugee
definition when making its decision and complied with the CRC. If a
claimant does not meet the definition, he is not considered a refugee and
the application is denied. In Kim, the brothers were not fleeing their native
country on account of one of the five enumerated reasons in the
Convention Refugee;70 consequently, the court could not grant them
asylum. However, while the claimants were denied refugee status, the
court did emphasize that when deciding on an immigration case regarding a

68. Id. ¶ 76.
69. Kim 2010 FC 149 at ¶ 76.
70. Id. ¶ 11.

216

HICLR/HRPLJ

[Vol. 40:2/14:1

child, the court must consider the CRC.71 Similar to Kim, in Baker,72 the
court highlighted the importance of the CRC. While the Court did state, “it
is not to say that children’s best interest must always outweigh other
considerations,” it also emphasized how the CRC should be considered
when deciding an immigration outcome that affects the child.73 Taking
Baker into account demonstrates that if the brothers in Kim had fled their
native country in order to escape persecution on one of the enumerated
grounds, the CRC would have more likely than not helped them get refugee
status.
While these are only a few cases out of the many that come through
the immigration court, they do show how the CRC is given significant
consideration and makes an impact. The Court references the CRC and,
reinforces their obligation to comply with the provisions before deciding on
a case outcome regarding a child. Similarly to Canada, Australia is also a
party to the CRC.

III.

Australia

Australia has also ratified the CRC and the Refugee
Convention.74 As a signatory to the Refugee Convention, Australian
courts must interpret the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 195875 in
a way that corresponds to the international obligations. Australia adopted
the Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee.76 Australia “has
undertaken in the [Refugees Convention] by granting a protection visa in an
appropriate case and by not returning a person, directly or indirectly, to a
country where [he] has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees
Convention reason.”77

71. Id. ¶74.
72. Baker, 1999 CarswellNat 1124.
73. Baker, 1999 CarswellNat 1124, at ¶ 74.
74. UNHCR, State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol 1-2, supra note 27.
75. Migration Act of 1958 (Act No. 62/ 1958). Current legislation governing
immigration to Australia.
76. Plaintiff M70/2011, 2011 244 CLR 144, 1, supra note 29.
77. A Refugee Convention reason is being persecuted on account of race, religion,
political opinion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group. Plaintiff
M70/2011, 244 CLR 144, ¶175.
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Immigration Process

In order to cope with the flood of migrants fleeing to Australia,
Australian officials “intercept boatloads” of refugees and place them in
detention on the remote Australian territory of Christmas Island or Pacific
Island nations, such as Nauru or Manus Island.78 The refugees are
processed and may lodge an asylum claim in the respective island. If the
asylum claim is granted, the refugees are settled in the country or have the
option of moving to Cambodia.79 If the asylum claim is denied, the
applicant may seek review of the decision through the Refugee Review
Tribunal (RRT), which provides a final, merits review of decisions.80 If the
RRT grants a claim, the applicant is eligible for relief; if the RRT affirms
the previous denial of relief, the applicant may be able to challenge the
decision at the Federal Circuit Court through judicial review.81
Australia’s own Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946
(“IGOC”) guides the country’s courts when they consider immigration
cases involving children. The IGOC applies to any unaccompanied child
who comes to Australia intending to be a permanent resident.82 Under the
IGOC every unaccompanied child arriving in Australia is designated a
guardian, referred to as the Minister,83 who serves as the child’s
representative throughout the immigration process. The Minister remains
the guardian of the unaccompanied child until the child reaches “majority,
leaves Australia permanently or otherwise ceases to fall within the
provisions of the IGOC Act.”84 Similarly to Canada there is also judicial
recognition of the CRC.
For example, in Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, the Court held that “for the purposes of international

78. Pamela Boykoff & Ivan Watson,“Children Urge Australia to Free them from
Nauru island’ prison’” CNN, Jan. 27, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/27/asia/australianauru-children-detention/.
79. What Happens at the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)? Refugee Advice &
Casework Service, at 8, http://www.racs.org.au/wp-content/uploads/FS4_What_happens_
at_an_ RRT_hearing__print.pdf.
80. See The UN Refugee Agency, Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Refworld,
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/AUS_RRT.html.
81. What Happens at the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)? Refugee Advice &
Casework Service,
82. Id. at 153.
83. Mary Crock & Mary Anne Kenny, Rethinking the Guardianship of Refugee
Children after the Malaysian Solution, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 437, 437 (2012) [hereinafter
“Crock & Kenny”].
84. See Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act of 1946 (Act No. 45/1946).
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refugee law, children are often amongst the most vulnerable groups of
refugees in special need of the protection of the Convention. They
sometimes arrive in a country of refuge without parents or guardians.”85
Both the IGOC and this language seem to indicate that the Australian court
system has the best interest of the child at heart. However, there is a
fundamental flaw in the Australian system.
The Australian immigration process is structurally flawed because the
child’s representative is also their prosecutor. The Minister is the
appointed guardian under the IGOC Act and is also their Judge under the
provisions of the Migration Act. As a result, the person who is designated
to protect the best interests of the child is also the child’s prosecutor.86
In what appears to be an effort to correct this irony, the Court has
often held that the Migration Act and the IGOC should be read together
when deciding on a child’s refugee claim.87 The court has stated that if
“there is some conflict between the possible exercise of a power under the
Migration Act and the Minister’s duties under the Guardianship Act, the
duties must prevail.”88 The guardianship of the child must come before the
duty to prosecute. Additionally, “Section 198A89 of the Migration Act and
section 6 of the Guardianship Act should be interpreted consistently with
Australia’s international obligations under the [CRC].” Under both of
these Acts, before deciding to deport a child from Australia, the officer
must take into account the best interest of the child.90

B. Vulnerability of Children Deserves Special
Consideration
In Minster for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
v. VFAY, the applicant91 was a 15-year-old who fled Afghanistan to escape

85. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201
CLR 293, ¶ 76 (AUSTL).
86. Crock & Kenny, supra note 83, at 448.
87. Id.
88. Plaintiff M70/2011 2011 244 CLR 144.
89. Migration Act of 1958 (Act No. 62/ 1958) §198(a)(1), imposes on an officer a duty
to remove from Australia as soon as reasonably possible an unlawful non-citizen who is in
detention under section 189(3) [hereinafter “Migration Act of 1958”].
90. Migration Act of 1958, supra note 89; Guardianship Act, supra note 84.
91. There are two applicants in this case, however, they had separate court hearings. For
the purposes of this paper, I will only focus on applicant, VFAY. See Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. QAAH of 2004, (2006) HCA 53
(Austl.).
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the Taliban’s recruitment of young males for military services.92 His claim
hinged on his fear that he “would be taken to the front lines to fight for the
Taliban and that he would be killed.”93 He was denied a protection visa
under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the ground that the delegate was not
satisfied that he was a minor or came from Afghanistan.94 When the
Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) heard the case they found that the
applicant was 16 years old and fled Afghanistan because of his fear of the
Taliban, they still denied him refugee status stating there was “no longer
any real chance that [he] would face persecution by the Taliban95 if he were
to return to Afghanistan.”96 The RRT concluded that his fear was “not
well-founded within the meaning of the Refugees Convention,” thus the
applicant “did not satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration
Act.”97 Further, the RRT stated that the minor was not considered as
belonging to a particular social group since “children or unaccompanied
young people” are not considered particular social groups.98 The RRT
denied the child refugee status. However, the RRT did not consider the
CRC before making its decision. As will be seen in the judicial review
below, referencing the CRC is required and can affect the case outcome.
In judicial review, the “Minister may, if he so decides, exercise that
discretion on compassionate or humanitarian grounds”99 to grant the
applicant’s refugee status.100 Here, the Minister argued, “RRT had erred in
failing to refer to the CRC in considering whether children or separated
children constituted a particular social group in Afghanistan,” as well if
“separated children or unaccompanied Hazara minors could not constitute a
particular social group.”101 The Minister held that the RRT’s decision was
a “nullity and it was appropriate to grant prerogative relief.”102 The
Minister referenced the CRC in order to make the child’s case stronger and
void the denial of the visa. At court, the Minister argued in favor of the
claimant, accordingly looking out for the best interest of the child and
acting as a proper representative.
92. VFAY, 2003 FCAFC 191, ¶ 2.
93. Id. ¶ 19.
94. Id. ¶ 20.
95. The RRT held that circumstances in Afghanistan had changed in “a substantial and
material way” since mid- 2001. Id. at 25.
96. Id. ¶ 23-5.
97. Id. ¶ 31-33.
98. Id. ¶ 29.
99. Migration Act 1958, § 36(2) (Austl.).
100. VFAY, 2003 FCAFC 191, ¶ 6.
101. Id. ¶ 34-6.
102. Id. ¶ 36.
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Further, the Magistrate Court held that “it was inherent in the
reasoning of the High Court in Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293, that ‘children per se are
readily identifiable as a particular social group’ for the purposes of the
Convention.”103
The Minister argued that the CRC recognizes
unaccompanied Hazara children as an identifiable group for the purposes of
immigration.104 The RRT had denied the asylum status-in part-because they
did not believe the unaccompanied minors were an identifiable group.
Without being classified as a particular social group, the minors would not
have met the qualifications of a refugee.105 The Minister emphasized that the
CRC “underscores the point that children in society are an especially
vulnerable group deserving of special consideration and protection.”106
Further, the Minister also “considered that Articles 20(1) and 22(2) of the
CRC demonstrated that ‘children have been recognized internationally as an
identifiable group meriting consideration as asylum seekers.’”107
Ultimately, the Minister held the minor could appeal from the RRT’s
decision.108 In order to highlight the importance of a child having a
representative, and the impact it has on satisfying their best interests, one
must also look at Australia’s detention system and how it affects children.

C.

Representation Makes a Difference

Prior to the Migration Act’s changes in 2001, the immigration scheme
was “predicated on immigration detention for all.”109 The “detention for all
scheme” was based on the logic that detention is effective as a deterrent
measure. The changes to the Migration Act in 2001 included the
introduction of Sections 46A, 189(3) and 198A, stating a person who
arrived in Australia at “any one certain geographic locations would have no
access to the visa system unless the Executive decided that they should.”110
Under section 198A, the individual would not be under immigration
detention, but rather would be taken to another country to decide whether to
grant him protection.111 In deciding whether to take a person from Australia
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. ¶3 4.
Id.
VFAY, 2003 FCAFC 191, ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
Id. ¶ 63.
VFAY, 2003 FCAFC 191, ¶ 63.
Plaintiff M70/2011, 2011 HCA 32, at 149.
Id.
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to another country under section 198(A)1, an “officer must consider the
person’s individual circumstances.”112
As stated above, individuals,
including children, who are detained and regarded as “off-shore entry
persons,” are detained and processed on islands, including the remote
Australian territory of Christmas Island.113 The Migration Act 1958
mandates “incarceration as the default response to unauthorised arrivals.”114
However, when dealing with children, under Section 6 of the IGOC, the
Minister has a duty to “act to advance or protect the welfare of the child.”
In an effort to diminish the negative impacts that detention had on
children, in 2010, under the Migration Act 197AB, Minister Chris Brown
announced, “all children and families would be moved into communitybased accommodations by June 2011.”115 As opposed to the detention
facilities, in the community detention accommodations, children moved
freely in the community.116 By June 2011, 58 percent of the children in
immigration detention were moved into community facilities, while the rest
remained in detention facilities.117 The harsh detention environment
violates the CRC’s Article 22 provision of providing them “appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance” and Article 3’s “best interest of the
child” provision. The CRC states children are different than adults;
accordingly they should not undergo treatment that implies that they are the
same.

IV.

Comparing Canada and Australia

As seen above, both Canada and Australia do reference the CRC
during immigration proceedings regarding children. Further, Canada and
Australia provide some type of representative to an unaccompanied child
and are aware that, as stated in the CRC, children are different than adults,
and thus should be treated with special consideration. While the Minister is
both the prosecutor and representative of the child, in a compelling
example of Australia’s dedication to the best interest of the child,
Australia’s Minister Chris Brown announced that children would no longer
be held in detention facilities, thus acting as a child’s representative who
seeks the best interest of the child. Canadian immigration courts

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Crock & Kenny, supra note 83, at 443.
Id.
Crock & Kenny, supra note 83, at 444.
Id.
Id.
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acknowledge the importance of representation for children and do not
allow a hearing to continue without designating a representative to the
child, thus looking out for the best interest of the child.
The United States has not ratified the CRC raising the question of how
does it deals with cases regarding minors?
V.

United States

While the United States is not a party to the CRC, it is a party to the
Refugee Convention. In the following section, I will analyze how the
United States has changed its domestic law in order to comply with the
Refugee Convention. Looking at the United States’ changes after
becoming party to the Refugee Convention will shed light on how it could
change if it ratifies the CRC.

A.

Immigration Process

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) sets the law and
guidelines for granting status to undocumented individuals.118 A minor is
placed in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).119
Before the creation of DHS in 2002, children were treated like adults;
children were held in the custody of Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which included detention facilities.120 Now, under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, if the child is unaccompanied, he is
transferred into the care and custody of an office within the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS): the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR).121
The Refugee Act of 1980 establishes the asylum criteria to grant
refugee status.122 Undocumented individuals can apply for asylum either
affirmatively or defensively.123 As opposed to affirmative asylum
118. Christine M. Gordon, Are Unaccompanied Alien Children Really Getting a Fair
Trial?” 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 641, 652 (2005) [hereinafter “Gordon”].
119. Wendy Young, Megan McKenna, Kids in Need of Defense (“KIND”), The Measure
of a Society: The Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the
United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 249 (2010).
120. Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.- C. L.
L. REV. 247, 249 (2010).
121. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 USC § 279.
122. Gordon, supra 118, at 653.
123. Id. at 655.
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applications, defensive asylum applications are used as a defense for
appeal, at removal proceedings, or when the asylum officer fails to
recommend the case for asylum and the applicant appeals to an
immigration judge.124 This paper will only focus on defensive asylum
applications.
Section 101(a)(42) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to grant asylum to an undocumented individual who is unable or
unwilling to return to his native country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”125 The Act’s
definition of a class of refugees who
are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a
narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not
to be deported to the country where they are in danger,
mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the
motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.126
Article 33.1127 of the Convention imposed a mandatory duty on
contracting States not to return an individual to a country where he would be
persecuted on account of one of the enumerated reasons.128
Prior to becoming a party to the Convention, the Attorney General had
discretion to grant withholding of deportation to undocumented individuals
under section 243(h) of the INA.129 Article 33.1 of the Convention was the
counterpart of section 243(h) of the INA statute, accordingly, the Protocol

124. Id. at 656.
125. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, § 101(a)(42); 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42).
126. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 US 421, 424
(1987).
127. Article 33.1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that no
Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
128. Race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. 429.
129. Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that the
Attorney General withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his “life or
freedom would be threatened” thereby on account of specific factors, Cardoza- Fonseca,
480 US 423.
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does not actually require that the Attorney General must grant asylum to
anyone. In order to qualify for asylum, the individual had to demonstrate
that it was “more likely than not” he would be persecuted in the country to
which he would be deported.130
However, there was a change in the U.S. immigration process after the
implementation of the Refugee Convention. After becoming a signatory to
the Refugee Convention, an undocumented individual “no longer had the
burden of showing ‘a clear probability of persecution,’ but instead could
avoid deportation by demonstrating a ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’
(citing, INS v. Stevic, 467 United States 407, 413 (1984)). This substitution
adopted the ‘language of the Protocol as the standard.’”131 While it seems
that the Refugee Convention did bring changes to U.S. domestic law, one of
the reasons the U.S. agreed to sign the Refugee Convention and its
amendment, the Refugee Protocol, was because the “President and the
senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing
law.”132 Even with the implementation of the Refugee Convention, there
was no drastic change, the Attorney General continued to have the
discretion in granting asylum to an individual.
So why does this matter? Some may argue that this is indicative of
how the U.S. might treat the CRC if it decides to ratify. While one may
argue that if signing the Refugee Convention did not significantly impact
U.S. domestic law, then it is not worth signing the CRC, I disagree. As could
be seen with Australian and Canadian cases, the CRC has the ability to
significantly influence case outcomes.
While the U.S. has not ratified the CRC, it does have its own
guidelines for dealing with children’s immigration cases. The 2007
Guidelines for Immigration Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien
Children issued by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) states immigration judges must consider “best
interests” as a factor in the child’s immigration proceedings.133 However, it

130. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 (1984).
131. Although these languages are different, the Court never explicitly stated the
differences between them. Stevic, 467 U.S. 413.
132. Some examples of consistencies between U.S. law and the Refugee Protocol:
refugees in the U.S. already enjoyed protection and the rights which the Protocol call for;
the U.S. already met the standards of the Protocol and the Protocol did not required the U.S.
to admit new categories or numbers of aliens. Stevic, 467 U.S. 417.
133. Memorandum from David L. Neal, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to All Immigration Judges, Court Admins. Judicial Law Clerks & Immigration Court Staff,
Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 07-01; Guidelines for Immigration Court
Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children (May 22, 2007), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2007/05/22/07-01.pdf.
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also states that the “best interest of the child” cannot “provide a basis for
providing relief not sanctioned by law.”134 While the immigration judge
can take into consideration what constitutes the best interest of the child
when making the decision, the judge cannot base his entire decision solely
on what is best for the child if it does not comply with the law. Even if the
child may face danger in her native country and what is best for the child is
to remain in the United States, if the claimant does not meet the statutory
language requirements of the Convention Refugee135 definition, then the
child will not be granted status. The best interest of a child is “generally
left up to the discretion of the judicial decision-maker.136
This treatment of best interest is similar to what judges have stated in
Canadian and Australian courts regarding immigration proceedings dealing
with children.137 The CRC has the potential to tip the balance of the case in
favor of the child as seen in Baker.138 Therefore, if the United States were
to ratify the CRC, the treaty could have the same effect as it does in
Australia and Canada.

B.

Children’s Vulnerability

In Abay v. Ashcroft, two claimants—a mother and her nine-year-old
daughter—appealed an immigration judge’s asylum decision.139 The
mother and daughter fled their home in Ethiopia and applied for asylum on
the basis of past persecution, and fear of future persecution, on account of
their ethnicity, religious practice, and membership in a political party.140
The nine-year-old testified in court about her fear of mutilation.141 Her
expression of fear in that context came across as “general” or
“ambiguous.”142 However, when assessing her testimony, the Court was
advised to keep her age in mind since the INS’ guidelines for children’s
asylum claims “advises adjudicators to assess an asylum claim keeping in
mind that very young children may be incapable of expressing fear to the

134. Id.
135. Gordon, supra, note 122.
136. Keila E. Molina, “Are we there yet?” Immigration Reform for Children Left Behind.
10 REGENT J. INT’L L. 1, 32 (2013).
137. Kim, 2010 FC 149, ¶76.
138. Baker, (1999) CarswellNat 1124, ¶75.
139. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 636 (2004).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 640.
142. Id.
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same degree or with the same level of detail as an adult.”143 The Court of
Appeals granted the claimants’ appeal finding that they are “refugees”
within the meaning of the Act.144
In a similar context, in Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, two brothers
from Mexico applied for asylum on the basis of fear that soldiers would
force them to join the guerillas.145 The guerillas had killed their older
brother and kidnapped their father.146 The United States immigration judge
denied the brothers’ request for asylum on the basis that she did not find
their fear credible because the older brother returned to Mexico to visit his
parents after his brother was kidnapped and murdered.147 On appeal, the
court held that the Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims differentiates
between adults and children by noting that “harm a child fears or has
suffered . . . may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as
persecution.”148 Here, although the applicants were over the age of 18, hence
not minors, the court held that at the time of the events, they were minors,
therefore it was only fair to consider age a critical factor when determining if
they held a “well-founded fear of future persecution.”149
Both Abay and Hernandez-Ortiz, are examples of how immigration
courts deal with cases regarding minors. While neither of these cases
involves unaccompanied minors, because in Abay the minor entered with
her mother,150 and in Hernandez-Ortiz, the claimants were over the age of
18,151 both cases dealt with children. When dealing with children, the
immigration courts have made it a requirement to look at the Guidelines for
Children’s Asylum Claims.152 While one may argue that the Guidelines for
Children’s Asylum Claims is already protecting children’s interests even
without the CRC, the CRC can still have a major impact. Both Canadian
and Australian immigration courts look to the CRC when dealing with
children immigration cases, as well as their own guidelines. However,
there are important differences between the U.S. cases and the Australian
and Canadian cases. In the U.S. cases, there is a lack of any representation

143. Id.
144. Abay, 368 F.3d 642-6433.
145. Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1044 (2007).
146. Id.
147. Hernandez, 146 F.3d 1042.
148. Id. at 1045.
149. Id.
150. Abay, 368 F.3d 636.
151. Hernandez-Ortiz, 496 F.3d 1044.
152. See also, Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 146 (2006); Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d
307 (2004).
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and a lack of binding law. The guidelines are solely references and are not
in any way a requirement for courts to abide by. In order for a child to
establish his eligibility as a Convention Refugee he must prove it in court
or to the immigration officer. One of the biggest problems facing
unaccompanied children in U.S. immigration courts is lack of
representation.

C.

No Representation for Children

Distinct from Canada153 and Australia,154 which designate some kind
of representative to an unaccompanied minor, the United States does not.
In the United States, unaccompanied children who arrive seeking legal
status are not guaranteed a representative or a lawyer.155
The
unaccompanied child may have a lawyer, however it must be one that he is
able to retain and pay for himself. Unlike in felony criminal cases in U.S.
federal court, where the respondent has a right to an appointed attorney, the
same right does not apply in immigration law.156 As one can imagine, this is
practically impossible since the majority of these children come to the
United States by themselves and would have no idea how to go about the
legal system or have money to pay for a lawyer. At immigration hearings,
children “face the same types of immigration charges as adults, ranging
from entering the country illegally to overstaying their visas.”157 The
unaccompanied child is left without a representative to help him navigate
and understand the nature of the legal proceedings he is about to encounter.
While unaccompanied children do not have a right to an appointed
attorney, the government, however, does and is represented by DHS
attorneys.158
While the CRC does not require the courts to assign an
unaccompanied child a representative, as part of the “best interest” and
“providing protection and humanitarian assistance” to the child and as part
153. Asylum Officer Basic Training Course (“AOBTC”) Guidelines for Children’s
Asylum Claims, USCIS, RAIO, Asylum Division, Sept. 1, 2009.
154. What Happens at the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT)? Refugee Advice &
Casework Service, supra note 79.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
156. Jerry Markon, Can a 3-year old represent herself in immigration court? This judge
thinks so, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nation
al-security/can-a-3-year-old-represent-herself-in-immigration-court-this-judge-thinks-so/201
6/03/03/5be59a32-db25-11e5-925f-1d10062cc82d_story.html?postshare=18114571134607
54&tid=ss_fb.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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of the country’s own domestic law, children are given representation in
Canada and Australia. Canada and Australia both recognize that children,
specifically unaccompanied children, are among the most vulnerable
individuals,159 and as such require someone to represent them in court
proceedings. Ironically, the United States has recognized that children and
adults are different; especially in the way they react and express fear.160
However, the U.S. courts have yet to state that children are the most vulnerable
group of individual who require a representative. By becoming a party to the
CRC, the United States will have a legally binding document that could be
interpreted to require some type of representation. U.S. courts will have the
pressure of the international community to ensure that the children are treated
as children, which may require them to provide representation when the
child is unaccompanied.

VI.

Conclusion

Both Canada and Australia are parties to the CRC. The United States,
on the other hand, has yet to ratify. However, all three countries are parties
to the Refugee Convention. By being parties the Refugee Convention, all
three countries have agreed to abide to its provisions, in particular in
adapting the refugee definition into domestic law.161 Signing the Refugee
Convention did bring about a change to domestic law in all three
countries.162 By ratifying the CRC, the U.S. might also change the way it
deals with immigration cases regarding children.
U.S. immigration courts abide by the Guidelines for Immigration
Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children; however, it is not
the same as signing the CRC. The CRC emphasizes that courts should look
into the best interest of the child when deciding cases that involves a child.
The best interest of the child and providing protection provisions would
further urge the United States in assigning some type of representative to
an unaccompanied child who seeks protection. As seen in Baker163 the
Canadian court looked to the CRC before granting refugee status to the
mother because it was in the bets interest of her child. Similarly, in
Australia, in Minster for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
159. Stumf, 2002 FCA 148; see also, Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, [2000] HCA 19, ¶76 (Can.).
160. See Abay, 368 F.3d 640.
161. See IRPA, art. 96, 32(2).
162. Stevic, 467 U.S. 413, changed standard of review to comply with the Refugee
Convention.
163. Baker, 1999 CarswellNat 1124 ¶74.
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Affairs v. VFAY,164 the court looked to the CRC to determine that the claimant
was to be considered a member of the particular social group, which fulfills the
Refugee Convention definition.
All three countries state that the courts must do what is in the “best
interest of the child.” However, if the U.S. were really looking into the best
interest of the child, would it not make sense to appoint an attorney or some
type of legal representative? A four-year-old undocumented refugee
cannot process or understand the nature of the legal proceeding he is about
to embark on. By ratifying the CRC, the reception and process of minors
could be positively impacted.

164. VFAY, 2003 FCAFC 191, ¶2.

